摘要
Sponsoredsearchadvertisingisasignificantrevenuesourceforsearchengines.Toamelioraterevenues,searchenginesoftensetfixedorvariablereservepricetoininfluenceadvertisers'bidding.Thispaperstudiestheoptimalreservepriceforageneralizedsecond-priceauction(GSP)underbothstaticanddynamicsettings.Weshowthatifadvertisers'per-clickvaluehasanincreasinggeneralizedfailurerate,thesearchengine'srevenuerateisquasi-concaveandhencethereexistsanoptimalreservepriceunderbothsettings.DifferentfromastaticGSPauctionwheretheoptimalreservepriceisprovedtobeconstant,inadynamicsettingtheoptimalreservepriceisdependentonnotonlyadvertisers'per-clickvalues,butalsothenumberofadlinkssold.Asearchengineshouldgraduallyraisereservepriceasmorequalifiedadvertisersarrive,andmaintainthesamethresholdafterallfirst-pagepositionsareoccupied.
出版日期
2013年04月14日(中国期刊网平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)