OPTIMAL AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PRICING FOR HETEROGENEOUS PERIODS

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摘要 Thispaperstudiesaservicefirmwhosebusinesstimecanbedividedintoseveralperiods,eachprovidingdifferentvaluetocustomers.Heterogeneousserviceisamajorreasonresultinginimbalancesbetweensupplyanddemand.Sincecustomersdifferintheirdegreeofimpatience,firmscanusedifferentialpricingmechanismstooptimizetheirobjectivesandmatchsupplywithdemandineachperiod,byinducingcustomerstochoosedifferentperiods.Westudytwotypesoffirms,aninternalfirm,theobjectiveofwhichistomaximizethesystem′s(includingthefirmandallthecustomers)totalnetvalue,andacommercialfirm,whichaimstooptimizeitsownprofit.Thoughimpatiencefactorsarecustomers′privateinformation,foreachtypeoffirm,wederivetheoptimalincentivecompatiblepricingpolicy,underwhichallthecomingcustomerswillfollowthefirm′sassignment,thatis,patientcustomerswillbuytheserviceinhigh-valueperiods,buttheirwaitingtimewillbelonger,whileimpatientcustomerswillenterintothelow-valueperiods,buttheywillbecompensatedbyshorterwaitingtimes.Furthermore,intheinternalfirm,wealsoprovethatthismechanismenablesthedecentralizationofdecisions,whilemaintainingcentralizedsystem-wideoptimality.Numericalanalysisshowsthatwhenthereissufficientcapacity,theinternalfirmdoesnotalwaysneedtosetlowerpricesthanthecommercialfirmineveryperiod.
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出版日期 2008年01月11日(中国期刊网平台首次上网日期,不代表论文的发表时间)
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