简介:WiththedeepeningofelectricpowermarketreforminChina,themonopolyedgeofthestate-ownedelectricpowerenterpriseswilllose.Onthebasisoftheexistingpostperformancesalarymechanism,ChinesepowerenterprisesneedtooptimizetheincentivemechanismofR&Dstaff,toarousetheR&Dstaff’senthusiasmandcreativity,toadapttothenewmarketcompetitionandfurtherimprovemarketvalue.WhilsttheincentivemechanismoptimizingprocessingneedstoconsidernotonlythechangingmarketenvironmentbutalsothepersonalandworkingcharacteristicsofR&Dstaff.ThispapersummarizesthecharacteristicsofthecurrentChinesepowerenterprises’R&Dstaff:staff’stheoryqualityishigh,butinsensitivetothemarket;theyareconfrontedwithheavyworkloadanddiversifiedjobchoices;managerscanobservetheirbehaviorchoicesornot;besides,theprocessofR&DiscomplexandthemarketreactionsofR&Dachievementsareuncertain.Basedonthepremiseoftheabovefeatures,twoincentivemodelsareestablishedinthispaperfromthepointofviewofenterprisemanagers.Oneisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved;theotherisforthesituationwhenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved.Throughsolvingthemodel,weanalyzetheoptimizationpathofelectricpowerenterprisesR&Dstaffincentivemechanismundertheseconditions:(1)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescanbeobserved,managerscanpaymoretotheR&Dstaffwhodevelopproductswithhigheroutputvalue,inordertoencouragethemtoworkharder.(2)whenstaff’sbehaviorchoicescannotbeobserved,managersshouldtakereasonablestrategiesaccordingtothedifferentsituations:a.whenR&DstaffincentivetotallydependonthemarketvalueoftheR&Dachievements,managersshouldallocateworkloadrationallyaccordingtotheirdifferenttechnicallevels;b.whenthemarketreactionsofR&Dresultsbecomemoreprecarious,managersneedtoreducetheincentiveintensitywhichbasedonthemarketvalueandraisetheirfixe
简介:本文讨论了外商在大陆的R&D投资与中国自主创新的相互关系,及如何实现内外资R&D支出的平衡。近年来,中国的R&D投入迅速增长,科技实力不断增强。同时,随着跨国公司R&D全球化的迅猛发展,外资在中国的R&D投资影响日益扩大,研发经费占中国企业研发投入的比重达27%。在一些科技实力较强的国家,这一水平基本在30%左右。而科技实力最强大的美国和日本,这一比值更低,分别不超过15%和5%。因此,外资R&D的快速发展对中国自主创新战略提出了严峻挑战。本文在分析了近年来科技创新与外资R&D发展背景的基础上,着重讨论外资R&D在中国创新体系中的地位和作用,并封平衡外资与本土创新提出了政策建议。
简介:政府R&D补助是否一定促进企业R&D投入?针对这一问题,本文以区分政府R&D补助方式作为切入点,从理论角度分析事前一次性R&D补助、补贴率方式R&D补助及事后奖励方式R&D补助对企业R&D投入的不同影响;并使用A股医药制造业上市公司2007~2013年面板数据进行实证分析。本文研究发现,只有补贴率方式和事后奖励方式R&D补助显著促进了企业R&D投入,其余补助方式对企业R&D不存在显著促进作用。对样本按产权特征进行分组后,我们发现对于非国有样本,补贴率方式和事后奖励方式R&D补助都显著促进R&D投入;而对于国有样本,所有类型补助对公司R&D投入皆无显著影响。本文的结论表明,政府应更多使用补贴率方式和事后奖励方式R&D补助;企业产权特征是政府补助时值得考虑的因素。
简介:摘要:近年来,随着社会各阶层对环境保护意识的提高和对自然资源限制的收紧,实现钢铁行业的全面绿色发展是提高中国整体国家实力的重要举措。目前,这是钢铁工业有效实现绿色发展的进攻阶段,钢铁工业的绿色发展水平已成为未来经济发展的中心。基于绿色发展和绿色发展绩效评估等理论,本文件通过分析绿色发展绩效评价的现状,并使用平衡的结果表分析绿色发展绩效评价的必要性和可行性,为R钢铁企业构建了一个科学的绿色发展绩效评估系统,基于财务层面、内部流程层面、学习和增长层面以及社会效率层面的评估指标。
简介:Thepresentpaperemploystechniqueofgeographicalweightedregression(GWR)tomakeanempiricalstudyofChina'sR&Dknowledgespilloversatcitylevel.Conventionalregressionanalysiscanonlyproduce'aver-age'and'global'parameterestimatesratherthan'local'parameterestimateswhichvaryoverspaceinsomespatialsystems.Geographicallyweightedregression(GWR),ontheotherhand,isasimplebutusefulnewtechniquefortheanalysisofspatialnonstationarity.ResultsshowthatthereisasigniicantdifferencebetweenOLSandGWRinestimatingtheparametersofR&Dknowledgeproduction,andthattherelationshipsbetweenlevelofregionalinnovationactivitiesandvariousfactorsshowconsiderablespatialvariability.