简介:网络经济是为今天在巨大的连接描绘的经济元素之中的全球关系的一个术语。在资源和活动被分享的地方,新时代的中央行为是在互相相互依赖的关系的许多层次在深网网络把一切连接到一切,市场被扩大,费用和风险被减少。网络系统包含积极、否定的反馈。许多反馈进程创造复杂系统行为。为如此的一个网络,分析网络过程(ANP)途径似乎很适当。ANP方法使系统地与各种依赖和反馈经营系统可能。动态模型试着反映变化在真实或simulatedtimeand考虑网络模型部件常常正在演变。动态模型使用州的变量,流动,和反馈进程的概念。动态网络进程(DNP)是能在联网的经济处理时间依赖者优先级的ANP的扩展。
简介:Abankhadbetterrationitscreditifitfirstentersagraysystemofcreditinformationwhereitcannotdistinguishbetweenthelow-andhigh-riskborrowers.Asthebankkeepsalong-termrelationshipwithitsborrowersthebanklearnsabouttheborrowersthroughtime.WiththehelpoflogitmodelandBayesrule,abankcanprocesscustomer'screditinformationandbuildabettercredittermitgives.
简介:Thepaperstudieschannelchoicedecisionsinamulti-channelsupplychainunderastrategywherethereisanex-antecommitmentmadeontheretailpricemarkup.Themarketdemandisuncertainanddependentonthepriceandsalesefforts.Theresultsshowthatinanychannelstructure,whenmakingorderdecisionstheretaileronlyexaminesthepriceratioandthefluctuationsizeofrandomdemand,ratherthanthechannelcostandtheretailer’smarketingefficiency.Whentheretailpricerises,themanufactureriswillingtoincreaseinventoryquantityfordirectsales,becausethemanufacturer’sprofitmarginishigherindirectchannel.Theincreaseindemandfluctuationonlyaffectsthedegreeofchannelpreferencebutdoesn’tchangethemanufacturer’schannelchoice.Nomatterinwhichlevelthepriceratiois,whenthesalesefficiencyofretailchannelisnothighorthedemandproportionofdirectchannelislow,themanufacturerandtheretailerwillbebothapttochooseadual-channelstructure.Thenaddingadirectchannelbecomesamarketingstrategy,ratherthanacompetitoroftheretailchannel,andhelpsthesupplychainwinmoremarketdemand.
简介:TheemergenceofB2Belectronicmarketshasgreatlychangedtherelativebargainingpowerofbuyersandsellers.Westudytheequilibriummarketstructureinabuyer’smarket.Wefindthatbuyer-controlledB2BmarketsandneutralB2Bmarketshavedifferentequilibriumstructures,andtheemergenceofB2Bmarketswillincreasesocialwelfare,butitseffectonbuyersandsellerswillbedifferent:B2Bmarketsincreasetheconsumersurplusoftheendmarket,buttheireffectsonbuyerandsellerprofitsaremoderatedbytherelativebargainingpowerofbuyersandsellers.TheprofitsofthesidewithmuchweakerbargainingpowerwilldecreaseduetotheintroductionofB2Bmarkets.
简介:关于为在1980年代和1990年代的瓷器精力紧张的戏剧的衰落负责的主要因素有可观的争论。然而,很少详细分析被做了在20022005期间在精力紧张解释变化。在这份报纸,我们使用结构的分解分析(SDA)把精力紧张分解成五决定因素:精力输入系数,技术系数(Leontief反的系数),由产品的最后的要求结构,由范畴的最后的要求和最后的精力消费系数。我们然后进一步分解二个系数,精力输入系数和技术系数,进结构和真实系数。实验学习在2000经常的价格从1987~2005基于energy-input-output桌子被执行。结果证明在1987和2002之间,精力输入结构在精力紧张说明大多数衰落。然而,由产品的输入结构和最后的要求结构解释在2002和2005之间的精力紧张的增加。
简介:ThispaperdealswithH∞controlofa5th-ordermodelofsynchronousgenerators.First,byusingthemethodofexactlinearization,wetransformthe5th-ordermodelintoalinearone.Thenweassignthepoleofthelinearizedmodelintheopenlefthalfplane.Finally,weapplythedesignmethodoflinearH∞controltogetastatefeedbackcontroller.
简介:1.IntroductionLetGbeafinitegroup.ForaCayleysubsetSofGnotcontainingtheidentityelement1,theCayley(di)graphX~Cay(G,S)ofGwithrespecttoSisdefinedasthedirectedgraphwithvertexsetV(X)=GandedgesetE(X)={(g,sg)IgEG,s6S}.IfS=S--’,thentheadjacencyrelationissymmet...
简介:Reliabilityallocationproblemiscommonlytreatedusingaclosed-formexpressionrelatingthecosttoreliability.Arecentapproachhasintroducedtheuseofdiscreteintegertechniqueforun-repairablesystems.Thisresearchaddressestheallocationproblemforrepairablesystems.ItpresentsanintegerformulationforfindingtheoptimumselectionofcomponentsbasedontheintegervaluesoftheirMeanTimetoFailure(MTTF)andMeanTimetoRepair(MTTR).Theobjectiveistominimizethetotalcostunderasystemreliabilityconstraint,inadditiontootherphysicalconstraints.Although,aclosed-formexpressionrelatingthecosttoreliabilitymaynotbealinear;however,inthisresearch,theobjectivefunctionwillalwaysbelinearregardlessoftheshapeoftheequivalentcontinuousclosed-formfunction.Anexampleissolvedusingtheproposedmethodandcomparedwiththesolutionofthecontinuousclosed-formversion.Theformulationforallpossiblesystemconfigurations,componentsandsubsystemsarealsoconsidered.
简介:Weinthispaperexaminewarrantystrategyinatwo-stagesupplychainconsistingofamanufacturerandtwocompetingretailers.Themanufacturerproducestwosubstituteproductsandmarketsthemthroughthetworetailerstoagroupofconsumers,respectively.Foreachtypeofproducts,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantyandaretailer’sextendedwarrantyarebundledwiththeproduct.Weusegametheoreticmodelstoexploretheinteractionsbetweenthetwotypesofwarrantiesandthecompetitionbetweentheretailers.Forthispurpose,twoscenariosareconsidered:noretailerandboththetworetailersprovidingtheextendedwarranties,respectively.Ineachscenario,themanufacturer’sbasewarrantiesareassumedtobeoffered.Ourresultsshowthatwhentheretailersoffertheirextendedwarranties,themanufacturerhasnoincentivetoofferthebasewarranties;otherwise,themanufacturerhastoprovidethebasewarranties.Thecompetitionbetweenretailersintermsoftheproductsubstitutabilityhasnoimpactonwarrantydecisions,butaffectsallplayers’profitsinthesupplychain.Themanufacturercanprovidealongerwarrantylengthandhighercustomerwelfaretoacustomerthantheretailersdo,ifitismoreefficientthantheretailersinwarrantycost-efficiency,andviceversa.
简介:Thispaperstudiestheoptimalconsumption-investmentstrategywithHeston’sstochasticvolatility(SV)modelunderhyperbolicabsoluteriskaversion(HARA)utilitycriterion.Thefinancialmarketiscomposedofarisk-lessassetandariskyasset,whosepriceprocessissupposedtobedrivenbyHeston’sSVmodel.TheriskypreferenceoftheindividualisassumedtosatisfyHARAutility,whichrecoverspowerutility,exponentialutilityandlogarithmutilityasspecialcases.HARAutilityisofgeneralframeworkintheutilitytheoryandisseldomstudiedintheexistingliteratures.Legendretransform-dualtechniquealongwithstochasticdynamicprogrammingprincipleispresentedtodealwithourproblemandtheclosed-formsolutiontotheoptimalconsumption-investmentstrategyissuccessfullyobtained.Finally,somespecialcasesarederivedindetail.